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Abstract
Recent years have seen an increasing emphasis on information security, and
various encryption methods have been proposed. However, for symmetric en-
cryption methods, the well-known encryption techniques still rely on the key
space to guarantee security and suffer from frequent key updating. Aiming to
solve those problems, this paper proposes a novel text encryption method based
on deep learning called TEDL, where the secret key includes hyperparameters
in deep learning model and the core step of encryption is transforming input
data into weights trained under hyperparameters. Firstly, both communica-
tion parties establish a word vector table by training a deep learning model
according to specified hyperparameters. Then, a self-update codebook is con-
structed on the word vector table with the SHA-256 function and other tricks.
When communication starts, encryption and decryption are equivalent to in-
dexing and inverted indexing on the codebook, respectively, thus achieving the
transformation between plaintext and ciphertext. Results of experiments and
relevant analyses show that TEDL performs well for security, efficiency, general-
ity, and has a lower demand for the frequency of key redistribution. Especially,
as a supplement to current encryption methods, the time-consuming process of
constructing a codebook increases the difficulty of brute-force attacks while not
degrade the communication efficiency.
Keywords: text encryption, deep learning, hyperparameter
1. Introduction
Today, more and more important data is transmitted in text format, whose
security is guaranteed by various encryption methods. They include classic en-
cryption algorithms (e.g., 3DES,AES,RSA) that have been widely used, as well
as some innovative encryption algorithms (e.g., DNA algorithm [2, 11], chaotic
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map algorithm [16]). Especially, AES, a representative of symmetric encryption,
is rather popular and accepted as data encryption standard [31], due to its high
speed and low space performance. Besides, another symmetric-key algorithm
called one-time pad (OTP) [42, 37] proves to be unbreakable. However, some
defects still exist. Firsly, the strength of most symmetric-key algorithms relies
on the key size [40, 45]. It means that the security degrades proportionally
as the key space gets smaller. One solution is to increase the complexity of
the encryption algorithm. Then for the same size of key space, attackers need
more time to crack. But it sacrifices efficiency, namely, both communication
parties need to spend more time on encryption and decryption. It is a chal-
lenge to achieve a balance between security and efficiency. Moreover, for OTP,
when a large amount of information needs to be transmitted, it suffers from
the difficulty in key updating. The problem of secure key distribution makes it
impractical for most applications [15]. Therefore, cryptologists are constantly
designing more practical encryption methods to get close to OTP. The stream
cipher is one of the alternatives, while it is vulnerable if used incorrectly [38].
Deep learning [21] has become a hot field in artificial intelligence. By train-
ing, the learning model can automatically learn the mapping from massive data
to the labels. This process is controlled by some hyperparameters and generates
a large number of unexplained parameters. Sometimes these parameters act as
abstract representations of input data, although they do not seem to have any
clear relations. When those hyperparameters are unknown or changed, or when
the labels are altered, the exact parameters cannot be obtained. Therefore, a
deep learning model embodies the nature of encryption. In other words, re-
placing meaningful data with corresponding parameters can be regarded as an
encryption process [51]. A typical case is word embedding based on deep learn-
ing model [49, 8], the cornerstone of Natural Language Processing (NLP). The
most classic one is the Word2vec [29, 30], which is improved by Glove [33], fast-
Text [18], and so on. These models map words into distributed representations,
which consist of parameters. Once we change the hyperparameters or corpus,
the word representations (parameters) will change. In addition, deep learning
training usually takes a long time, and the adjustment of each hyperparameter
means a lot of time lapse. To some extent, this feature is useful to enhance
security.
In this paper, we introduce the above characteristics of deep learning into
text encryption and propose a novel symmetric encryption method for text en-
cryption named TEDL. It adopts a public corpus as the original corpus, two
copies of which are owned by both communication parties. They modify the
copy at hand to obtain a synthetic corpus under the guidance of the key, re-
spectively. The synthetic corpus owned by both should be confidential and
consistent. After that, same word embedding models are used to train on the
synthetic corpus under the hyperparameters specified by the key and construct
word vector tables. Combined with the SHA-256 function [35], they are further
processed to obtain time-varying codebooks, which is definitely consistent as
well. The sender replaces the plaintext with a ciphertext based on the codebook
and transmits it to the receiver. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext according
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Figure 1: TEDL overview: a two-stage encryption method
to the codebook in turn. The contributions of our paper are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, although there exists some work with respect
to the combination of deep learning and information security [24, 43, 50],
TEDL is the first to utilize the uninterpretability and time-consuming
training features in deep learning to realize encryption. Moreover, it is
the first time that the word embedding based on deep learning model is
used for encryption.
• TEDL has time-varying and self-updating characteristics, which are greatly
beneficial for reducing the frequency of key redistribution. The time-
varying refers to the variation of codebook as information is transmitted.
Consequently, for the identical word, its representation varies every time.
To some extent, it is close to the one-time pad. Besides, the concept of self-
updating means that both sender and receiver can reconstruct codebook
by revising synthetic corpus, without changing the key.
• TEDL is sensitive to the change of corpus. We prove that the process of
skip-gram hierarchical softmax (SGHS) is equal to implicit matrix decom-
position, beneficial to the better understanding of the word embedding
process. Moreover, it means that minor changes in the corpus can cause
a wide range of adjustments in training results, just as changes in a small
number of elements in a matrix lead to a wide variation in matrix decom-
position results. It directly supports the feasibility of our method.
• TEDL has a two-stage structure: codebook construction stage and com-
munication stage. The former needs a long time, and the brute-force crack
is performed at this stage. The latter is always time-saving, for it only
involves a search operation. And communication is mainly carried out at
the second stage. In this way, both parties are able to achieve relatively
high-speed communication while attackers still need more time to crack.
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• TEDL performs well for security and high efficiency concluded by exper-
iments and relevant analyses, which involve the recoverability, time cost
for a brute-force attack, frequency analysis, correlation analysis, sensitiv-
ity analysis, efficiency, and generality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we outline
our method and give some preliminaries, respectively. In Section 4 we illustrate
the key design. Section 5 details the encryption/decryption process. Section 6
introduces the self-updating mechanism in TEDL. We prove the feasibility of
TEDL in Section 7 and the security analysis is shown in Section 8 with exper-
iments in Section 9. Section 10 reveals the limitations of TEDL. Section 11
discusses the related work. Finally, Section 12 draws conclusions and further
work.
2. TEDL Overview
It seems that security and efficiency are usually contradictory. Increased
encryption algorithm complexity probably means strengthened security and re-
duced efficiency, which motivates people to search for the best trade-off. In this
paper, our TEDL method provides a novel way to deal with this problem. As
Figure 1 shows, TEDL contains two stages: (1) communication preparation and
(2) communication process.
At the first stage, both parties in the communication get copies of the pub-
lic corpus and modify them under the instruction of the key, completing the
construction of confidential synthetic corpora, respectively. And the synthetic
corpora mastered by both parties are expected to be consistent. Afterward,
the hyperparameters in the key instruct the training on the synthetic corpora.
Hence word vector tables are established, followed by a further process on them
with the SHA-256 function to obtain codebooks. So far, the first stage called
communication preparation ends.
At the second stage, when a word requires transmitting, the sender refers
to the codebook at hand and uses the plaintext as an index unit to obtain the
corresponding ciphertext. And then the ciphertext is sent to the receiver. In
turn, the receiver decrypts the ciphertext based on the mapping in the code-
book, which is equivalently an inverted indexing operation. After completing
the transmission of a word, both ends adjust the codebook in a certain way.
Therefore, when the next word needs to be transmitted, it is encrypted based
on the new codebook.
3. Preliminaries
We first give the symbols and fundamental definitions used throughout the
paper as Table 1 lists. Here, we take an example illustrated in Figure 2 to ex-
plain some definitions. Given a corpus (Public corpus & Original corpus)
such as selections from Shakespeare, we can generate word vectors with a word
embedding model based on deep learning. As we add some additional text to the
4
Table 1: Symbols and Definitions
Symbol Definition
Cα original corpus
Cγ synthetic corpus
v0j initial incremental corpus unit
vij incremental corpus unit
Gι (Vι, Eι) initial incremental corpus graph
Gβ (Vβ , Eβ) incremental corpus graph
Eι set of initial edges
Vι =
{
v0j
∣∣ j ∈ N+}:
set of initial vertices
Eβ set of edges
Vβ =
{
vij
∣∣ j ∈ N+, i ∈ N}:
set of vertices
d(u, v) distance between node u and v
R R = max
v0j∈Vι,vij∈Vβ
d
(
v0j , v
i
j
)
:
radius of incremental corpus graph
Cβ incremental corpus
D word vector dimension
D′ hash vector dimension
X total number of bits of key
Ni part of key
tδ interval time
tι initial time
tiβ update start time
tis update finish time for sender
tir update finish time for receiver
Ciα current original corpus
Ciβ current incremental corpus
Ciγ current synthetic corpus
corpus, word vectors will change. Provided an ISBN number, 9780679405825
(Initial address), we can find the book JANE EYRE, from which we can select
some content, denoted as v01 (Initial incremental corpus unit), according to
page number or chapter number. Then we can enlarge the initially selected con-
tent by including their adjacent pages or chapters, denoted as vij (Incremental
corpus unit). Finally, all of them serve as the new corpus (Incremental
corpus) to be added to the original corpus.
Definition 1 (Public corpus). A corpus can be obtained by anyone and should
be chosen according to the language of the plaintext.
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Figure 2: An example of using ISBN address to construct the synthetic corpus
It could be the Bible, Wikipedia1, iWeb2 and so on.
Definition 2 (Original corpus). Define Cα as either a public corpus or an ex-
pired synthetic corpus, which is a synthetic corpus generated under the guidance
of the last key.
Definition 3 (Synthetic corpus). Define Cγ as a corpus obtained by revising the
original corpus. Make sure the synthetic corpus contains words in the plaintext,
otherwise, their corresponding ciphertext is not available.
Definition 4 (Initial address). It gives the location of textual information and
is part of the key.
There exist various addresses, such as arXiv ID, uniform resource loca-
tor (URL), digital object identifier (DOI), International Standard Book Num-
ber (ISBN) and so on.
Definition 5 (Initial incremental corpus unit). Define v0j as the text obtained
from the initial address.
Definition 6 (Incremental corpus unit). Define vij as the text that has a rela-
tionship (e.g.,citation, context) to the initial incremental corpus unit.
Definition 7 (Initial incremental corpus graph). Define Gι as an abstract struc-
ture inside the initial incremental corpus. It is a directed graph.
In the example,Vι = v
0
1 and Eι = ∅.
Definition 8 (Incremental corpus graph). Define Gβ as a directed graph that
represents the structure inside the incremental corpus.
Definition 9 (Distance between node u and v). Define d (u, v) as the length of
the shortest directional path from vertex u to vertex v.
1https://corpus.byu.edu/wiki/
2https://corpus.byu.edu/iweb/
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The distance between adjacent vertices (e.g., v01 and one of its references v
1
1)
is 1. And the distance between the two nodes without a directed path is ∞.
Definition 10 (Radius of incremental corpus graph). Define R as a measure
of the size of graph.
All the nodes, whose distance from the initial incremental corpus unit is not
greater than a certain value R, are added to Vι, forming the Vβ . When R = 1,
3 vertices are included in Vβ in that example. Obviously,
Vι ⊆ Vβ (1)
Specifically, Vι = Vβ if R = 0.
Definition 11 (Incremental corpus). Define Cβ as a set of incremental corpus
units. Actually,
Cβ = Vβ (2)
Following definitions are relevant to cookbook update.
Definition 12 (Interval time). tδ defines the update cycle agreed upon by both
parties at the algorithm level.
Definition 13 (Initial time). tι defines the moment when communication prepa-
ration starts for the first time.
Definition 14 (Update start time). tiβ defines the time when the i-th version
of Cβ starts to build.
Definition 15 (Update finish time for sender). tis defines the moment when the
sender completes the codebook update.
Definition 16 (Update finish time for receiver). tir defines the moment when
the receiver finishes the codebook update.
Definition 17 (Current original corpus). Ciα defines the original corpus used
between tiβ and t
i+1
β .
Definition 18 (Current incremental corpus). Ciβ defines the valid incremental
corpus between tiβ and t
i+1
β .
Definition 19 (Current synthetic corpus). Ciγ defines the valid synthetic corpus
between tiβ and t
i+1
β .
4. Key
The key used in TEDL includes the following components:
X = X1 +X2 +X3 +X4 (3)
The meanings of symbols are as follows:
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• X1: The X1-bit binary number N1 indicates the initial address. It may
be specific to the chapter number or even page number.
• X2: The X2-bit binary number N2 is equal to R.
R = N2,0 ≤ N2 < 2X2 − 1, N2 ∈ N (4)
• X3: The X3-bit binary number N3 is used to calculate the dimension D
of a word vector. Considering that D is required to be a multiple of 5 in
the subsequent process of dealing with them, which will be detailed later,
the value range of D is
D = 10 + 5N3,0 ≤ N3 < 2X3 − 1, N3 ∈ N (5)
• X4: The X4-bit binary number N4 is equal to the seed used for initializa-
tion of word vectors. For example, the initial vectors for each word w are
set with a hash of the concatenation of w and str (seed), where seed = N4.
5. Encryption and Decryption
5.1. Synthetic corpus
Both parties build Cγ based on the contents of the key (N1 and N2). For
different kinds of addresses, the process is similar but slightly different. In the
previous example, we have illustrated how ISBN serves as the initial address,
which is relatively easy to comprehend. For a better understanding of Cγ con-
struction, we take a more complicated example, where arXiv ID is adopted as
the address.
Assuming N1 = 0001111100000100111001111001012 and N2 = 102, we can
find a paper according to arXiv ID arXiv:1301.03781, whose content is denoted
as v01 . Besides, it has 32 references denoted as v
1
1 , · · · , v132. So far R = 1, which
does not satisfy N2 = R. Given that each reference cites other. Therefore, we
can enlarge the content due to further citations. Each of them is an incremental
corpus unit vij and all compose an incremental corpus Cβ . Finally, we add it
to the Cα to construct Cγ , shown in Figure 3. It is worth mentioning that the
language of Cβ does not require the same as Cα, which may work sufficiently well
for encryption since we do not need word vectors to have a good performance
on the semantic representation.
5.2. Training
After obtaining Cγ , both sides perform the training with deep learning model
according to the hyperparameters determined by the N3 and N4.
Firstly, we select a proper model to facilitate the discussion below. It should
be qualified for the following Model Requirements:
1. Own at least a public training set.
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Figure 3: A more complex example of Cγ construction using arXiv ID address
2. The incremental training set (e.g. Cβ ) can be addressed with a key
and should not be deliberately manufactured but ubiquitous or at least
accessible to both parties.
3. The trained parameters should be sufficient and develop some relationship
with the data objects.
4. It is more suitable for an unsupervised model or a semi-supervised model.
The supervisory part of the latter should be reflected in the public training
set. As for a supervised learning model, it is acceptable if it meets Model
Requirement 2 after both parties to communications negotiate additional
conditions. For example, they agree on a uniform label for the incremental
training set.
Obviously, the word embedding model meets those requirements.
Training is the core step in TEDL. In the following, we will discuss what
kind of word embedding model is suitable and put forward some precautions in
the training process.
5.2.1. Sparse word vectors and dense word vectors
Models for word embedding are divided into two categories, namely the
sparse word embedding model (e.g.,VSMs [46]) and the dense word embedding
model (e.g.,Word2vec [29, 30]). In the sparse word embedding model, the word-
context matrix is constructed, and its initial form is a matrix of frequencies.
Each element in a frequency matrix is determined by cooccurrence times of a
certain word in a certain context. In practice, the process of matrix construction
can be time-consuming when the corpus is large. The entire corpus needs to be
scanned, in which each word and its corresponding frequency are recorded, and
the results are finally placed in a matrix [17], denoted by F. The row vector of
the i-th row of the word-context frequency matrix corresponds to the word wi,
denoted as f(i:), and the column vector of the j-th column corresponds to the
context cj , denoted as f(:j). The value of fij is expressed as the frequency at
9
which the i-th word co-occurs with the j-th context. This matrix has nr rows
and nc columns.
Based on the initial matrix of frequencies, some adjustments are made to
weight the elements in the matrix. [10] has proposed the Pointwise Mutual In-
formation (PMI), which works well for word-context matrics. And the variation
of PMI, Positive PMI (PPMI) [32], is also a powerful form for distributional
representation of words.
When PPMI is applied to F, the new matrix, denoted by X, has the same
size as F. The value of an element, denoted by xij , is defined as follows [46]:
pij =
fij∑nr
i=1
∑nc
j=1 fij
(6)
pmiij = log
 pij(∑nr
i=1 pij
)
·
(∑nc
i=j pij
)
 (7)
xij =
{
pmiij , if pmiij > 0
0, otherwise
(8)
In this definition, pij is the probability of co-occurrence of the word wi and
the context ci. Apparently, the matrix X is very sparse. And when Cβ is
added to Cα, the size of both matrix F and matrix X may change. However,
most zeroes remain unchanged, causing the risk of crack increasing, especially
when selecting a partial component of the word vector for encryption. For
example, if the original vector of word is v = (0 0 0 0.5 0.5) and the new one is
v′ = (0 0 0 0.25 0.75), it is extremely dangerous when the first 3 dimensions of
the vector are used to replace the word for encryption.
Such a sparse matrix is hence not available for our encryption method, due
to the invariance of some elements. So we need to adopt dense word vectors.
5.2.2. De-randomization
For encryption methods, there are many requirements to be met, one of
which is that the encryption results should be sufficiently random and unique,
that is, the output should be consistent for the same input. Because of the
random factors in some models (e.g., the negative sampling strategy [30]), it
is possible to generate totally different word vectors under the same hyperpa-
rameters. For example, in the negative sampling strategy, only a sample of
output vectors, selected by random methods (e.g., the roulette-wheel selection
via stochastic acceptance), are updated instead of the whole output vectors,
accelerating the training. Therefore, it is suitable for other applications but not
for encryption.
Besides, note that for a fully deterministically-reproducible result of running,
the model must be limited to a single worker thread, to eliminate ordering jitter
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from OS thread scheduling. There is no case where the word vectors derived
by multi-process accelerated are consistent with ones derived by single-process
training.
To sum up, it should be prevented that any random behavior results in dif-
ferent outcomes for the same input. Both sides of the communication cannot
encrypt or decrypt when randomness exists. Similarly, when both sides carry
out information transmission, the attacker cannot use tricks such as negative
sampling and multi-process to speed up a brute-force crack. The reason is that,
even if the attacker is currently trying the exact key, the derived codebook mas-
tered by the attacker is inconsistent with the one used for communication. We
hence choose the skip-gram hierarchical softmax (SGHS) model as an instance.
5.3. Word vector table
After training, the word vector table is generated, where the word serves as
an index unit whose corresponding value is a D-dimensional real vector. The
word vector table based on Cα is represented as Tα, and one based on Cγ is
denoted as Tγ . For a certain word w, the corresponding vectors in Tα and Tγ
are vα|w and vγ |w, respectively.
Let vα|w and vγ |w be row vectors. If Tγ is not subsequently processed but
directly used for encryption, the similarity between vα|w and vγ |w should be
low enough, otherwise, it is dangerous. The similarity can be measured by the
cosine similarity, which is defined as
simxx (w) = cos
(
vα|w · vTγ
∣∣
w
)
(9)
The first condition to ensure security is:
simxx (w) < limitxx, 0 < limitxx < 1 (10)
where limitxx is a parameter, determined by the security requirements related
to the specific application scenario.
In addition, in Tα, there exist words with high similarity to w. They are
usually synonyms of w or words closely related to it. Rank them as w1, w2,
w3, · · · according to the similarity with w. The similarity between wi and w is
defined as
simxy (w,wi) = cos
(
vα|w · vTα
∣∣
wi
)
(11)
Obviously, the following relationship is true.
simxy (w,wi−1) > simxy (w,wi) , i = 2, 3, · · · (12)
Then we give the second condition for ensuring security.
simxx (w) < simxy (w,wn) , n = limitxy ∈ N (13)
where limitxy is a parameter. If the simxx (w) is too large, or even greater than
simxy (w,w1), the attacker can easily conclude that the plaintext corresponding
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to the ciphertext vγ |w is exactly w. Therefore, limitxy should also be set
properly according to the security requirements.
In the case where hyperparameters are identical, simxx (w) is actually de-
termined by the ratio of Cβ to Cα. To meet both requirements for simxx (w),
make sure a proper size of Cβ .
Obviously, if the word vector table (Tγ) is directly used for encryption, the
above conditions are not enough for security, and it is hard to determine the
selection criteria about limitxx and limitxy, thus calling for more careful and
sophisticated design.
5.4. Time-varying codebook
Here we adopt a relatively more trustworthy way: process Tγ with SHA-
256 function, for its avalanche effect and irreversibility. Figure 4 shows the
transformation for a vector of word wi. Next, we detail the process and explain
the corresponding motivation.
16-digit...16-digit16-digit -dimensional
real...realreal
80-digit...80-digit80-digit
-dimensional
-dimensional
256-bit aaaa...256-bit aaa256-bit aaa -dimensionalD¢
D
D
D¢
0
,0i
h
0
,1i
h
0
, ' 1i D
h
-
/ 5D D¢ =
Figure 4: Basic transformation
Since Sigmoid function σ (x) = 11+e−x is used in the SGHS model, the derived
real vectors are irrational vectors, precisely. In theory, irrational numbers are
infinitely long but limited by the computational accuracy of a computer, the
results are finite and should be kept as a few effective numbers. To simplify the
discussion, double-precision floating-point numbers are specified in the program,
which means that the real numbers in Tγ are truncated to 16-digit precision or
53-bit precision.
To send the word vector to SHA-256 function, a simple method is to convert
the first 16 significant digits of each dimension into a 16-digit integer. For
example,
0.000642163111111111110 ⇒ 642163111111111110
642163111111111111234110 ⇒ 642163111111111110
If the dimension D = 200, all 16-digit integers are spliced to obtain a 3200-digit
integer, feeding SHA-256. However, it is extremely time-consuming, degrading
the encryption efficiency.
Conversely, feeding a short integer string causes a significant waste of space.
For a 32-digit integer, at most 1032 different results can be generated, far less
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than 2256, the space of the message digest generated by SHA-256. Therefore,
we consider connecting five 16-digit integers together, the space of which is
1080 ≈ 864× 2256.
As information is transmitted, the primary process of communication is
shown in Figure 5, where D = 200, h0i,j denotes the j-dimensional in the vector
shown as the fourth line in Figure 4. Its corresponding word is wi.ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ ǥ̶̶ ǥ̶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Figure 5: Primary processing for word vector table
In essence, it is similar to the polyalphabetic cipher [4] for resistance to
frequency analysis. In other words, in the case where the same word is used
multiple times, the corresponding hash, always the first component in a hash
vector, is indexed from a different vector table each time.
However, it is not safe enough due to the relatively limited vector tables.
Thus we design the manner of codebook usage, shown in Figure 6. We divide
the D′-dimensional vector into two parts, a (N3 + 1)-dimensional vector and a
1-dimensional vector, which are named loop vector and reserved vector, respec-
tively. hki,j denotes a value in loop vectors while rhi denotes a value in reserved
vectors.
rhi = h
0
i,D′−1 (14)
hki,j = hash
(
hk−1i,j || rhi
)
, k = 1, 2, · · · (15)
where || stands for concatenating. The concatenation of two 256-bit values
results in a 512-bit number. hash denotes the SHA-256 function.
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Figure 6: Advanced processing for word vector table: codebook
If hki,0 has been used, h
k+1
i,0 is computed and then placed in the last dimension
in the loop vector, while hki,0 is discarded. Other hashes in the loop vector shift
left. Each time only the first dimension hash acts as ciphertext. The difference
lies in that as the information interacts, the hash vector table keeps changing.
Therefore, it is namely a time-varying codebook. Such a design can greatly
extend the replacement table. Ideally, since the space of the hash is 2256, there
are 2256 alternatives to the same word.
6. Self-updating Codebook
The self-updating codebook updates itself periodically without changing the
key. To some extent, the time-varying characteristic is a self-renewing mecha-
nism, which is one of the self-update mechanisms of TEDL.
This section explores another self-updating mechanism in TEDL. Consider-
ing that the codebook is obtained through a series of steps from Cγ , the update
of the codebook can be achieved by updating Cγ , or by regulating the hyper-
parameters (e.g., the seed).
6.1. Synthetic corpus update
From definition 12 to 19, i = 0, 1, · · · , and it denotes the i-th validity period
of the codebook. We make the following reasonable assumptions:
• The time when one gets the key is known to the other.
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Figure 7: Update process
• From the beginning of constructing Cβ to the completion of building Cγ ,
the content of Cβ being acquired is static and unchanged.
• Both sender and receiver will not exchange information during the period
from the start of the construction of Cβ to the completion of the code-
book update, that is, the communication needs to be aborted from tiβ to
max
(
tis, t
i
r
)
.
The variables defined above have the following relationship:
t0β = tι (16)
tiβ = t
i−1
β + tδ, i = 1, 2, · · · (17)
Ciα = C
i−1
γ , i = 1, 2, · · · (18)
Ciγ = C
i
α + C
i
β , i = 0, 1, · · · (19)
Note that, except for C0α, C
i
α cannot be made public because it is the synthetic
corpus Ci−1γ in the previous period.
The update process is illustrated as Figure 7. At t0β , both parties begin to
construct C0β , adding it to C
0
α to form C
0
γ . At t
1
β , C
0
γ is renamed to C
1
α, which
can be further updated to C1γ . Two ways to renew Cβ are provided here, the
choice on which can be negotiated at the algorithm level:
1. Increase R of Gβ , enlarging Cβ .
2. Since there is information transfer between both ends, if the amount of
data delivered is sufficiently large, it can act as Cβ .
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Figure 8: The update of Cβ as R increases
In theory, infinite rounds of corpus update can be implemented without
changing the key. Nevertheless, if the partial deletion is not adopted, the corpus
will become larger and larger. Especially, in case of the first way, Cβ will grow
exponentially. If the initial radius R of Gβ is set to 0, it changes as Figure 8.
To meet the conditions suggested in Section 5.3, Cβ is required correspond-
ingly more. Therefore, it is recommended to agree at the algorithm level that
restoration is performed every x times. It means the next version of Cx−1α should
be C0α instead of C
x
α, so Eq.(18) is corrected to be
Ciα =
{
C0α, i = nx
Ci−1γ , i 6= nx
n, i ∈ N (20)
In addition to restoration, the split operation is also optional. Assuming
that two articles are enough to satisfy the conditions in Section 5.3, we may
divide 32 articles into 16 incremental corpora, which are used at t1β , t
2
β , · · · ,t16β
in turn. In this way, Cγ is controlled to a certain scale by the restore operation
and the split operation.
6.2. Seed update
It is also possible to update the codebook by periodically changing the value
of the training parameter seed and assign it a value from reserved hashes. Two
reasons support for choosing a reserved vector:
1. The value of the reserved vector is constant throughout the encryption
and decryption process.
2. The reserved vector merely serves as partial input of SHA-256 and never
exposed. Due to the irreversibility of SHA-256, the attacker cannot derive
the value of the reserved vector from the ciphertext.
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7. Interpretable word embedding by matrix decomposition
Given that the feasibility of TEDL is based on the fact that the distributed
representations of all the words change after adding a small amount of incremen-
tal corpus to the original corpus, it is necessary to understand why the training
process can achieve the desired effect.
As discribed in Section 5.2, the distributed representations refer to dense
word vectors. Two Densification Methods are offered here to generate them
instead of sparse vectors.
1. Apply truncated SVD to the sparse matrix derived from a sparse word
embedding model.
2. Use a dense word embedding model.
As for Densification Method 1, since the matrix X′ calculated after adding
a small amount of corpus can be regarded as the original matrix X is locally
perturbed. If the location of the disturbance is appropriate, the effect is global
and each component of word vectors change under finite precision conditions.
As for Densification Method 2, actually, training can be interpreted as matrix
decomposition. It has been proved that the embedding process of skip-gram neg-
ative sampling (SGNS) and noise-contrastive estimation (NCE) is an implicit
matrix decomposition [22], while GloVe [33] is an explicit matrix decomposi-
tion [23]. And Rong derived and explained the parameter update equations of
the Word2vec models [36]. Now, we give a theorem about the essence of the
process of skip-gram hierarchical softmax.
Theorem 1. The process of skip-gram hierarchical softmax (SGHS) is an im-
plicit matrix decomposition.
Proof. In a corpus, words w ∈ Vw and their contexts c ∈ Vc, where Vw and Vc
are the word and context vocabularies. The vector representation for word wi
is vwi , while for ci is vci . For word wi, the contexts are the words surrounding
it in an L-sized window wi−L, · · · , wi−1, wi+1, · · · , wi+L, one of which is ci. We
denote the collection of observed word-context pairs as S. We use # (wi, ci) to
denote the number of times the pair (wi, ci) appears in S. Similarly, # (wi) is
the number of times wi in S and # (ci) shows the number of times ci occurred
in S. They are defined as:
# (wi) =
∑
c′i∈Vc
# (wi, c
′
i) (21)
# (ci) =
∑
w′i∈Vw
# (w′i, ci) (22)
Consider a word-context pair (wi, ci). In the hierarchical softmax model,
no output vector representation exists for context words. In other words, the
vector vci is untrained. Instead, there is an an output vector v
′
n(ci,j)
, which is
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trained during the training process, for each of the |Vc|−1 inner units. And the
probability of a word being context ci, the output word, is defined as
P (wout=ci | wi)=
∏L(ci)−1
j=1 σ
(
[[ci, j]] · v′n(ci,j)
T
vwi
)
(23)
σ (x) =
1
1 + e−x
(24)
[[ci, j]] = [[n (ci, j + 1) = ch (n (ci, j))]] (25)
where L (ci) denotes the length of path, n (ci, j) means the j-th unit on the
path from root wi to the word ci,ch (n) is the left child of unit n, v
′
n(ci,j)
is
the output vector of n (ci, j), vwi is the distribution representation of wi, as
well as the output value of the hidden layer, [[x]] is a specially defined function
expressed as
[[x]] =
{
1, if x is true
−1, otherwise (26)
Obviously, the following equation is true.
|Vc|∑
i=1
P (wout = ci | wi) = 1 (27)
The probability of going left at an inner unit (including the root unit) n is
defined as
P (n, left) = σ
(
v′n
T · vwi
)
(28)
which is determined by both the output vector of the inner unit and the hidden
layer. Similarly, the probability of going from unit n to right is
P (n, right) = 1− σ
(
v′n
T · vwi
)
= σ
(
−v′nT · vwi
)
(29)
The parameter update process is derived in the following part. For simplicity, we
consider the situation of one-word context models, which are easily extended to
skip-gram models. We simplify some notations without introducing ambiguity
first:
[[·]] = [[n (ci, j + 1) = ch (n (ci, j))]] (30)
v′j = v
′
n(ci,j)
(31)
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The global objective is trained using stochastic gradient updates over the ob-
served pairs in S, defined as
E =
∑
w∈Vw
∑
n∈Vc
# (w, c) log P (wout = c | w) (32)
For a training instance, the local objective is defined as
E (wi, ci) = log P (wout = c | w) (33)
=
L(ci)−1∑
j=1
log σ
(
[[·]]v′jTvwi
)
(34)
In SGHS, it is the vectors of the inner units and a hidden layer that are
trained. On the path from wi to ci, for each inner unit, [[·]] is either 1 or -1.
And for each wi, there exist # (wi) paths (including cases where the same path
is repeatedly counted). Assume that a total of k paths pass through n, there
must be kl paths through the left child nodes of n, while kr paths walk via its
right child, obtaining:
k = kl + kr ≤ # (wi) (35)
The global objective hence is rewritten as
E =
∑
wi∈Vw
∑
ci∈Vc
# (wi, ci)
L(ci)−1∑
j=1
log σ
(
[[·]]v′jTvwi
)
(36)
=
∑
wi∈Vw
∑
n∈Vn
[
kr + (kl − kr) log σ
(
v′n
T
vwi
)]
(37)
where Vn denotes the collection of inner units n. We take the derivative of E
with regard to v′n
T
vwi , obtaining
∂E
∂v′n
Tvwi
=
∑
wi∈Vw
∑
n∈Vn
[
kl−(kl+kr)σ
(
v′n
T
vwi
)]
(38)
We compare the derivative to zero, arriving at
σ
(
v′n
T
vwi
)
=
kl
kl + kr
(39)
Hence,
v′n
T
vwi = ln kl − ln kr (40)
Finally, we can describe the matrix M of |Vw| rows and |Vn| columns that SGHS
is factorizing:
MSGHSin = v
′
n
T
vwi = ln kl − ln kr (41)
Therefore, the embedding process of SGHS also performs an implicit matrix
decomposition.
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Subtle modification to the original corpus is equivalent to perturbation on
the implicit matrix, which can eventually lead to radical change in the training
results.
However, just matrix decomposition, whether explicit or implicit, cannot
ensure that every dimension of each word vector changes. Very few individual
components of the word vector may remain unchanged, which is a fatal weakness
for encryption. From this perspective, Densification Method 1 is not secure
enough. Instead, Densification Method 2 can solve this problem by increasing
the number of iteration epoch. In particular, as long as it is greater than
one round, the effect of local disturbances will be comprehensive, resulting in
changes in all word vectors, which is confirmed by related experiments.
8. Security Analysis
According to the Kerckhoff guidelines, a good encryption method should
have a large enough key space. The key space of TEDL is 2X . Considering
the example with arXiv address, set X1 = 30, X2 = 2, X3 = 8, X4 = 256. In
theory, X4 can be infinite, but given that the space of hash is 2
256, we assign
that X4 = 256. Otherwise, referring to the drawer principle, there must be two
different hashes colliding. See Table 2 for a comparison of the key space.
For the same key space, the time required to complete encryption for each
key differs. There may be doubts here: for the attacker, the longer time for
trying each key, the more time will be spent on the crack, but in turn, does the
time required for the communication parties to normally transmit information
increase dramatically? It is not the case for TEDL, owing to the two-stage
structure. The brute-force crack is mainly performed at the first stage while
the communication between the two parties is mainly carried out at the second
stage. Therefore, it improves safety while ensuring efficiency.
In addition, TEDL does not directly use the key in the encryption. Instead,
the key is the instructor during the encryption and decryption process. There-
fore, techniques that involve ciphertexts analysis, such as Differential Crypt-
analysis [7], Linear Cryptanalysis [27], Truncated Differentials [20], Boomerang
Attacks [48], Impossible Differentials [19] and others [12, 13], are not effective
since these ciphertexts involve limited knowledge about keys, making it infeasi-
ble for attackers to predict keys.
Besides, TEDL bases the security on the difficulty in parameter interpreta-
tion in deep learning, which is another hard problem. Not only the parameters
themselves are uninterpretable, but the trend of their variation is also unex-
plained, which is core challenge, as described in [1].
Furthermore, the application of SHA-256 makes TEDL more secure. In cryp-
tography, the avalanche effect refers to an ideal property: when the input makes
the slightest change (for example, inverting a binary bit), an indistinguishable
change in the output occurs (there is a 50% probability that each binary bit in
the output is inverted). The ideal state of nonlinear diffusivity is the avalanche
effect. [28] shows that SHA-256 has excellent nonlinear diffusivity. Therefore,
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Table 2: Key space
Method Key bits Key space
TEDL 296 2296
AES 256 2256
Salsa20 256 2256
3DES 168 2168
DES 56 256
even if word vectors are similar, the outputs are quite different. Moreover,
because of the irreversibility of the secure hash function, the relation between
ciphertext and plaintext is extremely weak and intractable. It is hard for an
attacker to decrypt. Finally, other related security analyses will be illustrated
with experimental results.
9. Experiments and Performance Analysis
This section presents the experiments and corresponding analysis of TEDL,
showing that it achieves a balance between security and efficiency, which make
it suitable for transmission of a large amount of data. All the experiments are
performed on an identical platform with system configuration of i7 processor @
2.50GHz and 8 GB Ram, and evaluated on two datasets in different languages,
one is Chinese Wikipedia corpus (about 1.3GB) 3 and the other is a subset of
the English Wikipedia corpus (about 600MB) 4. Relative codes are available on
GitHub 5.
Our experiments focus on following issues:
• Recovery. It verifies that the ciphertext is decrypted successfully, even if
the ciphertext is tampered with in an insecure channel.
• Consumed time for brute force. It measures the ability of encryption meth-
ods to resist brute force attacks.
• Frequency analysis. It is about the frequency distribution of cipher sym-
bols, characterizes the confusion.
• Correlation. It refers to the correlation analysis between encrypted data
and original data.
• Sensitivity analysis. It also measures the strength of encryption methods
against cracking and hacking threats. For plaintext sensitivity or key sen-
sitivity, it is high when changing a small number of bits in plaintext or key
3https://dumps.wikimedia.org/zhwiki/
4https://dumps.wikimedia.org/enwiki/
5https://github.com/AmbitionXiang/TEDL
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results in a large variance in ciphertext. As for ciphertext sensitivity, it is
embodied when a natural error or intentional tampering in the ciphertext
is remarkable [26].
• Efficiency analysis. It measures encryption speed.
• Generality analysis. It studies whether a method is suitable for multiple
models.
9.1. Recovery
As described in Section 5.4, both parties only send and receive the first-
dimension hash in the time-varying codebook. The hash that can be restored to
a word is called a valid hash. Obviously, the number of valid hashes is equal
to the total number of word keys in the codebook, far less than 2256. When the
ciphertext is partially tampered with, the valid hash that has the most overlap
with it is selected from all the hashes of the first dimension, the plaintext hence
can be restored with a high probability. We define the recovery accuracy rate
(RACR) to measure the anti-interference and recoverability of TEDL.
RACR =
nc
nt
(42)
where nt denotes the total number of tampered hashes, nc stands for the count
of tampered hashes which are successfully restored to correct words.
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Count of tempered bits
0.0
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0.6
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(85, 0.98)
(93, 0.02)
RACR
Figure 9: Recoverability of tampered ciphertexts
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We randomly select 1000 words as samples, whose corresponding hashes are
tampered with. To test the recovery rate under different conditions, we set
the total number of tampered bits from 0 to 256 bits, and randomly choose
the tampering location. Experiments repeat to calculate RACR and we plot it
versus the number of tampered bits as Figure 9.
It shows that an invalid hash is recoverable if the count of tampered bits is
less than 85, otherwise, the original word is not able to be restored.
9.2. Consumed time for brute force
Now we explore the relationship between the time spent in stage one and
some of the training parameters (the number of iterations, the dimension D)
for an identical synthetic corpus (about 1 GB). The time of stage one consists
of two parts, time on model training and processing the original word vector
table. The experimental results are drawn as Figure 10. Obviously, time cost of
brute force is increasing linearly with the number of dimensions and iterations.
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Figure 10: Time cost on stage one
9.3. Frequency analysis
For English text, we explore texts of 2MB, 20MB, and 200MB respectively,
which are extracted from corpus6, and plot frequency distribution histograms
with respect to both plaintext and ciphertext, which are shown in Figure 11a.
6https://dumps.wikimedia.org/enwiki/
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Figure 11: Frequency distribution of plaintext and ciphertext
For text in Chinese, 2MB, 20MB and 200MB texts are encrypted accord-
ingly, and the frequency histogram is shown in Figure 11b. Obviously, TEDL
completely dissipated the original distribution instead by a fairly uniform dis-
tribution. It has a remarkable ability to resist against the statistical attack,
especially frequency analysis, and works in any language.
9.4. Correlation
The original data is instinctively considered words, while the encrypted data
is either word vectors or 256-bit hashes. It is hard to calculate the correlation.
Therefore, we need to redefine original data and encrypted data.
1. In the case of directly using the original word vector table, original data
is denoted by vα|w, which is generated after embedding training on the
public corpus under certain parameters, while encrypted data is vγ |w.
2. In the case of using a time-varying codebook, hα represents original data
and hγ denotes encrypted data. Both is obtained by further processing
described as Section 5.4, and they are corresponding to vα|w and vγ |w
respectively.
We carry out experiments in both cases mentioned above.
9.4.1. Directly using word vector table
In case 1, the correlation between the encrypted data and the original data
is measured by the cosine similarity defined by Eq.(9), rewritten as follows:
simxx (w) = cos
(
vα|w · vTγ
∣∣
w
)
(43)
We explore the effects of different training conditions, including the number of
iterations (epoch), the vector dimension (D), the ratio of Cβ to Cα (C ratio) and
the size of window (window), which indicates the maximum distance between
the current and predicted word within a sentence in the word embedding model.
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Figure 12: Correlation (measured by sim) as D and epoch change
Changing epoch and D. For other parameters, we set C ratio = 1 : 10000,
seed = 1, window = 5. We sort the sim of each word from small to large and
draw as Figure 12. Obviously, as D and epoch increase, the correlation between
the original data and the encrypted data decreases. Note that in the case where
epoch = 1, regardless of the word vector dimension, there is a phenomenon that
the correlation is 100%. On the other hand, as long as epoch is greater than
1, this phenomenon no longer exists. In addition, considering that as epoch
increases, the training process converges, which means word vectors update
slightly. Therefore, the setting of epoch is not included in the key but should
be agreed at the algorithm level.
Changing C ratio. For other parameters, epoch = 2, D = 200, seed = 1,
window = 5 and we test the correlation at a ratio of 1 : 10000, 1 : 1000,
1 : 100. The results are shown in Figure 13a. As C ratio increases, the sim
decreases, which is in line with expectations. However, the result relies on
language consistency in Cβ and Cα. If not, will the encryption effect drop?
We answer this question in the next experiment. If not specified, subsequent
experiments also proceed under the conditions mentioned above.
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Figure 13: Correlation (measured by sim) as C ratio changes
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Figure 14: Correlation trend as window changes
Language inconsistency exists. Unlike previous experiments, pure Chinese cor-
pus serves as Cβ . And we change the C ratio to observe trends in correlation,
pictured as Figure 13b. Obviously, the encryption effect is not much different
from the last result, which indicates the impact of language inconsistency is
negligible.
Changing window. Apart from the default conditions, we set C ratio = 1 :
10000 and depict the result as Figure 14a. We can conclude that window is also
related to correlation. However, it does not mean that the variation of window
directly changes the representation of the same word significantly, while it is
evident when changing D. Therefore, it is necessary to verify this, under the
condition that no Cβ is added to Cα, as well as the default conditions. The
Eq.(43) is revised as
sim′xx (w) = cos
(
vα|w · v′αT
∣∣∣
w
)
(44)
where vα and v
′
α is trained on the same Cα but with a different parameter
window. Figure 14b shows the result. We can see the size of window directly
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Figure 15: Correlation (measured by rxy) as D changes
influences the representations of words. It is feasible to add it to the key content.
9.4.2. Using time-varying codebook
In this case, each word is encrypted to a 256-bit hash hγ . We conduct exper-
iments on both English and Chinese corpus. As described in [3], the correlation
is measured by
rxy =
count (hα ⊕ hγ)
length (hα)
(45)
where ⊕ denotes XORing, hα ⊕ hγ generates a binary string, count (string) is
the count of ‘0’ in the string, length (hα) represents the length of string hα,
which is considered the original data.
As can be seen from the experimental results in Section 9.4.1, as long as
epoch > 1, each word vector definitely changes. Without losing the generality
of test, we confine epoch = 2 and test rxy by changingD, depicting the frequency
distribution histogram (hist) and frequency distribution function (pdf) of rxy
as Figure 15.
The horizontal coordinate represents rxy, and the vertical coordinate denotes
the corresponding frequency. Obviously, rxy is concentrated around 0.5, which
27
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65
CRC
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
pdf
hist
(a) Modifying N1
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65
CRC
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
pdf
hist
(b) Modifying N4
Figure 16: Key sensitivity distribution
means that half of the bits of the encrypted data are changed compared with
the original data. It is a good encryption property. Since it is safer to use time-
varying codebook, we only consider this case in all subsequent experiments.
9.5. Sensitivity analysis
To measuring sensitivity of plaintext and key, the operation is to make
a slight change to either and calculate the change rate of ciphertext (CRC),
defined as
CRC =
Dif
(
hγ , h
′
γ
)
length (hγ)
(46)
where hγ is the original ciphertext, h
′
γ is the ciphertext as minor modifications
occur to plaintext or key, Dif
(
hγ , h
′
γ
)
is the count of distinct symbols in hγ
and h′γ .
For ciphertext sensitivity, we disturb several bits of ciphertext to observe
whether it is still in the valid hash collection Hv, which contains all valid
hashes at the moment. The ciphertext change sensitivity (CCS) is defined as
CCS = 1− nco
nt
(47)
where nt denotes the total number of invalid hashes, nco stands for the number
of tampered hashes still in valid hash collection.
9.5.1. Key sensitivity
For a given key, we choose a key that differs by only one bit, which can be
located at any component of the key, and juxtapose ciphertexts for the same
word. Given that components N2 and N3 are related to the C ratio and D,
respectively, which have already been considered, only N1 and N4 remain to be
altered for further experiments.
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Table 3: Words and their synonyms
Words Corresponding synonyms
people persons/humans/individuals/folk/human beings/
humanity/mankind/mortals/the human race
female woman/girl/lady/lass/shelia/charlie/chook/wahine
male masculine/manly/macho/virile/manlike/manful
· · · · · ·
Modifying N1. We transform N1 = 0001111100000100111001111001012 to N
′
1=
0001111100000100111001111001112 in the example using arXiv ID, which means
the address is converted to arXiv:1301.03783. Therefore, another paper serves
as the whole Cβ if N2 = 0. Obviously, as N2 grows, disturbing N1 causes a
greater impact. For all the words in Cα, the changes in their representations
are presented in Figure 16a.
Modifying N4. Once N4, related to the seed, is altered, the whole initial word
vectors will experience the earthquake, resulting in entirely distinct represen-
tations. When the seed is changed from 1 to 2, the result is shown in Figure
16b.
From the above two subsections, we know a bit of interference in the key
can cause a huge difference in representations. Almost 50% bits in ciphertext
reverse, close to the avalanche effect.
9.5.2. Plaintext sensitivity
For the word embedding model, words here are atomic. A slight change
in plaintext can be interpreted as replacing a primitive word with a synonym
or a morphologically similar word. Collins dictionary7 is used for searching
synonyms.
We select six groups of more common words to experiment, namely “people”,
“male”, “female”, “beautiful”, “good”, “look” and their synonyms, partially
shown in Table 3. For each word in the first column, we compare the represen-
tations of themselves and ones of their synonyms and calculate the CRC. The
frequency distribution of which is shown in Figure 17. Obviously, the distri-
bution of CRC is still concentrated around 50%, that is, it characterizes good
sensitivity.
9.5.3. Ciphertext sensitivity
The experimental setup is similar to Section 9.1. We randomly select 1000
words as samples for the experiment, whose corresponding hashes are tampered
with. To test CCS under different conditions, we set the total number of tam-
pered bits from 0 to 256 bits, randomly choose the tampering location, and
7https://www.collinsdictionary.com/
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Figure 17: Plaintext sensitivity distribution
check whether it is still in the valid hash collection. Our experimental result is
CCS ≈ 1 no matter how many bits are tampered with.
As described in Section 5.4, although each word may have 2256 representa-
tions, at a certain moment during the communication, the size of the valid hash
collection is equal to the number of different words in Cγ . The probability is
expressed by
P (tamper (hγ) ∈ Hv) = |Vw|
2256
(48)
Assuming |Vw| = 108, P (tamper (hγ) ∈ Hv) is approximately equal to 1, which
is in accordance with the experimental result.
9.6. Efficiency analysis
The comparison of efficiency among TEDL and some popular cryptosystems
is depicted as Figure 18. It shows that our method is efficient.
9.7. Generality analysis
Multiple word embedding models can be applied in TEDL. In addition to
the Word2vec used in previous sections, NNLM [5], fastText [18], and GloVe [33]
are applied in this section.
Different models have different parameter settings. For example, as for fast-
Text, most parameters function the same with those in Word2vec. These pa-
rameters are set as the default conditions mentioned above, that is epoch = 2,
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Figure 19: Generality about models to be applied
D = 200, seed = 1, window = 5 and C ratio = 1 : 10000. Besides, there exist
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some unique parameters in fastText due to using enriches word vectors with
subword(n-grams) information (e.g., the max length of char ngrams as well as
the minimum. Here we set them to 5 and 3, respectively). The parameters in
other models are set according to the characteristics of the model. But make
sure to de-randomize the training process.
The correlation defined as Eq.(45) serves as a representative indicator to
measure the effect of encryption, which is shown in Figure 19. It shows that
multiple models can be used to encryption, and they behave similarly.
10. Limitations
Though novel it is, TEDL suffers from some drawbacks. Firstly, security
has not been theoretically proved, since it is hard to interpret the variation of
parameters in deep learning model. Secondly, the choices on the kind of initial
address are limited, for the sake of key sensitivity. Thirdly, the efficiency of
encryption and decryption is negatively correlated to the number of entries in
the codebook, for the process mainly involves lookup operations. In addition,
in spite of almost impossible, two different words may map to the same hash,
which means the results of inverted indexing may be more than one. Under this
case, the decryption should depend on the context to select the correct plain-
text. Besides, the first stage takes too long, during which the communication
must suspend, bringing inconvenience. Moreover, some requirements to models
should be met, which is detailed in Section 5.2. Especially, models must com-
pletely eliminate randomization. Finally, the self-updating mechanism in this
paper remains to be improved.
11. Related Work
With the development of deep learning and increasing attention to informa-
tion security, the application of deep learning in the field of information security
has developed and extended. Although it is the first time to apply deep learning
model, especially word embedding directly to encryption, prior to this, word em-
bedding has been combined with other information security technologies, which
mainly utilize the similarity between word vectors. For example, in [52], word
vector is used on encrypted cloud data to achieve lightweight efficient multi-
keyword ranked search by finding the most similar query vector and document
vector. Besides, in [25], the original keyword is substituted by a similar key-
word in case the text retrieval fails. This replacement is achieved by finding
word vectors with high similarity. Instead, our method acts in a diametrically
opposite way, where achieving low similarity between the representations of the
same word is expected.
Although neural network-based generative sequence models unconsciously
memorize secret information, as described in [44, 9], that is, given models and
data, there is a way to determine whether the data is used as part of the training
data set, resulting in the disclosure of secret data. It is not the case for our
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method, where any word possibly used is definitely contained in training corpus
but it is hard to determine whether the word is the corresponding plaintext. In
contrast, we just take advantage of the characteristic, that is, the subtle changes
in the corpus can be memorized, assisting encryption.
In addition to [36, 22, 23, 41] mentioned in Section 7, many papers also aim
to issue the interpretability of model, such as [47, 6, 14]. Accordingly, some
evaluation methods for interpretation have also been proposed [39]. However,
these are not enough. Research on interpretability is important for both im-
proving and cracking TEDL. In turn, the exploration of TEDL can promote the
development of model interpretability.
12. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a new text encryption method based on deep learn-
ing named TEDL. It is the first time to directly apply deep learning model to
encryption, mainly utilizing the uninterpretability and time-consuming training
features. The time-varying and self-updating characteristics of TEDL deal with
the problem of key redistribution and the two-stage structure makes it hard to
carry out brute-force attack and makes it efficient for communication. More-
over, TEDL bears other superior properties such as anti-interference, diffusion
and confusion, high sensitivity, generality and so on, all of which have been
confirmed through experiments.
It is worth mentioning that both encrypted objects and models are expand-
able. Objects in various forms, such as binary numbers, texts, images, videos,
or even multimodal information, can be encrypted with TEDL. For example,
assuming TEDL adopts word embedding model and aims to encrypt binary
numbers, a binary library can be constructed serving as public corpus while
additional text in either original or binary form acts as an incremental corpus,
then training performs on the synthetic corpus. Inspired by the fact that more
and more objects can be embedded (e.g., the network [34]), it is natural that
those objects can be encrypted by TEDL with embedding model, for which we
might as well name as embedding encryption.
As for the extensibility of models, all the models that satisfy the Model Re-
quirements in Section 5.2 can be employed by TEDL, and it is easy to meet those
requirements. For example, nearly all deep learning models own public training
set and it is easy to get whether texts, images or videos on the Internet as long
as their corresponding addresses exist, meeting Model Requirements 1 and 2.
Besides, considerable models, such as CNN and LSTM, own a large number
of parameters, satisfying Model Requirement 3. Moreover, as for supervisory
models, they are still available, as long as labels are preconcerted without the
necessity of secret, thus satisfying Model Requirement 4. Finally but not least,
TEDL can not only use for encryption. From the perspective of generating a
key stream, such a large number of parameters in the deep learning model may
be utilized, which is also worth exploring.
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